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Abstract
* 
This paper uses a difference-in-difference methodology similar to the one 
originally proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to test whether defaulting hurts 
the more export-oriented industries. Strong support for this hypothesis was found, 
but contrary to the findings of previous studies, our estimations suggest that the 
effect of defaults is short-lived. 
 
JEL Codes:  F34; F10 
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1. Introduction 
 
A clear understanding of the principles on which the sovereign debt market operates remains 
elusive. The legal framework is not as complete and transparent as in the case of private debts, 
and the enforceability of creditor rights remains untested or unreliable. Absent dependable legal 
rights, investment in sovereign debt instruments is based on the expectation that governments 
will make a faithful effort to service their debts even in trying circumstances. In an often-quoted 
judgment of 1875, a British judge stated “These so-called bonds amount to nothing more than 
engagements of honour.” Economists tend to see the decision to service government bonds from 
a somewhat different perspective: they view it as the result of comparing the cost of servicing 
interest and principal of the debt with the adverse consequences that would follow from 
defaulting on those payments—that is, the costs of default. This is why understanding the costs 
of default is a critical part of understanding the working of the sovereign debt markets. 
The literature on the costs of sovereign default has traditionally focused on two channels: 
reputation and international trade. There is considerable debate, conceptually and empirically, on 
the validity and quantitative importance of each of them.
1 This paper focuses on the trade 
channel and applies an empirical technique that is novel to the sovereign debt literature but that 
has been used elsewhere to test for the significance and magnitude of the alleged harmful effects 
of sovereign defaults on international trade. The empirical technique is the difference-in-
difference approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998), which is applied more broadly here to include 
cross-country effects as well. We find evidence to support a statistically significant and 
economically sizeable effect of defaults on trade.  
There are two main mechanisms through which trade may be affected: direct import 
sanctions or restrictions, and damage to the creditworthiness of exporters. The evidence for 
direct trade sanctions is not abundant. There are not many recorded cases where countries have 
applied quotas, tariffs or trade embargoes in retaliation for non-compliance in debt service. Yet, 
it is possible that in those cases where trade sanctions were likely to be applied, debtor countries 
made an extra effort to avoid default. From a theoretical perspective, trade sanctions are probably 
not “renegotiation proof” in the sense that creditor countries would be reluctant to apply them ex 
                                                       
1 We will not review this literature here. For recent reviews, see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005), Tomz 
(forthcoming), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).   5
post because they would also suffer from the trade loss.
2 Moreover, an action of this type could 
be controversial because it would benefit one group (the investors) to the detriment of others 
(firms engaged in international trade and consumers in general) and might also be inconsistent 
with the general strategic interest of the creditor country that may consider them.  
We find a more solid basis to the case for trade finance as a mechanism that hurts a 
defaulting country in almost every case. When a country is in a situation of external financing 
distress, it often resorts to exchange controls or capital outflow restrictions of various sorts. This 
affects the repayment capacity of all private debtors, and the effect would be stronger in the case 
of short-term credit such as export-linked credits. In fact, international credit rating agencies like 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s recognize that the credit rating of any private debtor is 
affected by the probability of a sovereign default because a sovereign default raises the 
possibility of imposition of exchange controls that would impair the debt service ability of 
private debtors.  
Systematic empirical research on the trade consequences of debt defaults has only started 
recently. Rose (2002) examines how debt restructurings granted by the Paris Club of official 
lenders have affected bilateral trade flows. He finds that defaults have strong and persistent 
effects on bilateral trade, with the implication that the nonpayment of financial obligations with a 
given official creditor affects trade mostly with that country.   
This paper looks for a more general effect and focuses on the performance of export-
intensive industries following episodes of sovereign default. This would be consistent with a 
number of channels including, for example, credit quality deterioration of exporters even when 
no trade action is taken by any country. We find that the effect is significant. Our estimates 
suggest that a more export-oriented industry (in the 75th percentile of the distribution) would see 
its growth drop by two percentage points relative to a less export-oriented industry (in the 25th 
percentile of the distribution) in each year in which the sovereign is in default. In contrast to 
Rose (2002), however, we find that the effect is short-lived, since we find little evidence of any 
residual effect after the sovereign emerges from default.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the estimation methodology in 
detail. Section 3 provides details of the data that were utilized. Sections 4 and 5 present the 
                                                       
2 A commonly cited case is the non-default by Argentina in the 1930s, when the country had most of its debts and a 
large fraction of its exports with England. Tomz (forthcoming), however, questions the validity of this interpretation.   6
econometric results for aggregate debt, and for a disaggregation of bank and bond debts, 
respectively. Section 6 offers some conclusions. 
2. Empirical Methodology 
To test whether sovereign default is particularly costly for exporters, we use a difference-in-
difference approach similar to the one originally used by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and examine 
whether export-oriented industries experience more severe output loss at time of default. One 
key difference with the work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) is that, instead of focusing on a cross-
section of industries-country, we follow the same strategy adopted by Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache 
and Rajan (2005) and use panel data at the industry-country-year level.
3 Specifically, we use 
industry-level data for the manufacturing sector to estimate the following regression: 
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where VAGRi,j,t measures real value-added growth for industry j in country i at time t;  j i a ,  
denotes a set of country-industry fixed effects,  t i b , a set of country-year fixed effects, and  t j c ,  a 
set of industry-year fixed effects. This set of fixed effects controls for all the country-specific, 
industry specific, and time-invariant country-industry specific shocks. This specification is in 
line with Rajan and Zingales (1998) and captures most of the factors—other than the variable of 
interest—that are likely to affect the performance of a given industry and greatly attenuate 
problems of omitted variable bias. SHVAi,j,t-1 is the share of value added in industry j country i 
measured at time t-1. This variable is mainly introduced to control for convergence and mean 
reversion effects. Thus, we expect α to be negative. EXPOU is an index of export orientation 
measured at the country-industry level (i.e., it does not vary over time but, unlike Rajan and 
Zingales’ 1998 index of financial dependence, it does vary across countries) and DEF is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 during default episodes and 0 otherwise. The interaction 
between default and export orientation (DEF*EXPOU) is the main variable of interest and tests 
whether sovereign defaults are particularly costly for export-oriented firms. In particular, a 
                                                       
3 Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache and Rajan (2005) use data on external financial dependence of industries to study how 
banking crises affect the economic performance of firms.   7
negative value of β  implies that export-oriented firms are harmed by sovereign defaults more 
than other firms, and would support the idea that sovereign defaults generate costs that operate 
through international trade channels.  
The regression includes two additional controls, the interaction between real exchange-
rate depreciation and export orientation (dRER*EXPOU) and the interaction between GDP 
growth and export orientation (GDPGR*EXPOU). These additional variables are necessary to 
control for the sharp changes in the domestic economy that normally take place at the time of 
defaults. In the first case, defaults usually result in large real exchange-rate depreciations, which 
in fact benefit export-oriented industries strongly. That benefit would be reflected in a positive 
δ . In the second place, debt crises are also usually underscored by sharp economic recessions 
(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2005; Borensztein and Panizza, 2005; and Levy-Yeyati and 
Panizza, 2005 test the output cost of defaults). Since export-oriented firms rely essentially on 
external demand, we also expect export-oriented industries to be less affected by cyclical 
developments than industries that sell products in domestic markets. Hence, we expect the 
coefficient  β to be negative. Controlling for these two interactions is particularly important 
because the real exchange rate and GDP growth are strongly correlated with default episodes.
4 
3. Data 
The main sources of industry-level data are the industrial statistics from UNIDO (2003 CD 
ROM) and trade data from Nicita and Olarreaga (2001). The main sources of country-level 
variables are the IMF’s International Financial Statistics for the consumer price index and the 
exchange rate, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators for real GDP growth, and 
Standard and Poor’s for the history of default episodes. 
Following the work of Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache and Rajan(2005), we use 3-digit ISIC 
level data from UNIDO and the CPI deflator from the IMF to compute industry-level real value-
added growth for 28 manufacturing sectors for 24 countries over the 1980-2000 period. We 
impose three restrictions on our sample. First, we exclude all country-years for which we have 
less than 10 industries. The rationale for this exclusion is to guarantee sufficient within-country-
year variation in the interaction between export orientation and default. Second, after calculating 
                                                       
4 For evidence of the correlation between default and the real exchange rate, see Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004). 
For evidence of the correlation between default and growth, see Sturzenegger (2004), Borensztein and Panizza 
(2005), and Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2005).   8
industry-level value-added growth, we exclude outliers by dropping the top and bottom 2 percent 
of the distribution. This is a standard strategy with this data set, which tends to be rather noisy. 
Finally, we exclude all countries that did not have a default episode over the 1980-2000 period. 
This third exclusion is innocuous from the point of view of the estimation of our main parameter 
of interest (because in countries that never defaulted over the period, the variable DEF*EXPOU 
is always equal to zero) and allows us to greatly reduce the number of parameters to be estimated 
(our reduced sample still requires the estimation of more than 1600 parameters).
5 These 
restrictions yield an unbalanced panel of 24 countries with a total of more than 9700 
observations, with value-added annual growth data ranging from -55 percent to 140 percent and 
averaging 4.6 percent (the median is 1.8 percent, see Table 1).  
We compute export orientation as the average ratio of exports over total sales (output in 
the UNIDO terminology) by industry and country. That is, for industry j in country i the index of 
























While data on exports are available for the 1976-1999 period, we found a large break in 
the exports-over-sales series for the period before 1982 and hence we focus on the 1982-1999 
sample. Therefore, the maximum value of N is 18. The average value of EXPOU is 7 percent 
(median 3 percent) with a range between 0 and 96 percent (Table 1). Table A2 in the Appendix 
reports average values of EXPOU for our sample of 24 countries, and Table A3 reports average 
value for the 28 three-digit ISIC industrial sectors.
6  
Our main default variable, DEFB2, takes a value of 1 in the first two years of the default 
episode (i.e., in the year in which the country defaults and in the year immediately after that). We 
use this two-year window because it is hard to determine precisely in which year the default may 
have its strongest effect. If the default episode happens at the end of the year, the effects are 
likely to be felt in the following year except, of course, to the extent that it was widely 
                                                       
5 We need to estimate 588 country-industry fixed effects, 401 country-year fixed effects, and 639 industry-year fixed 
effects. 
6 Note that while Rose (2002) focuses on bilateral trade, we compute export orientation using total trade of industry 
j.   9
anticipated by the markets. In the estimation, we experiment with different lag structures. We use 
the default dates recorded by Standard and Poor’s (2005), and include both defaults on 
international bank loans and defaults on sovereign bonds (in the robustness analysis we check 
whether there is a difference between these two types of default). The 24 countries included in 
our sample experienced 34 default episodes over the 1980-2000 period (one country, Iran, 
defaulted in 1978 and entered the sample period in default). Among these 34 episodes, 30 were 
defaults on international bank loans, three were defaults on sovereign bonds, and one was a joint 
bank-bond default (Table A4).
7 
4. Regression Results 
Our basic results are reported in Table 2. Column 1 reports our baseline specification. As 
expected, we find evidence of convergence as indicated by a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for the lagged share of value added. We also find that export-oriented industries tend 
to benefit from real depreciations (as indicated by the positive coefficient for dRER*EXPOU) 
and tend to be less procyclical than industries oriented to the domestic markets (as indicated by 
the negative, albeit not statistically significant, coefficient for GDPGR*EXPOU). 
More interestingly for our purposes, we find that export-oriented industries are 
particularly affected by default episodes as indicated by the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of DEFB2*EXPOU. Besides its statistical significance, the impact of default is also 
quantitatively important, as it implies that moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the 
export-orientation distribution increases the impact of default on value-added growth by 1.7 
percentage points (-0.017=0.218*0.01-0.218*0.09).   
In Column 2 we experiment with a different lag structure. In particular, we create a 
default indicator variable that takes a value of 1 in the first period of the default episode 
(DEF_ALL1) and four lags of this variable (DEF_ALL2 to DEF_ALL5). We find that the 
interaction of export orientation with all these variables has a negative coefficient (reaching a 
maximum in the year after the default), and three of them are individually statistically 
significant. More importantly, we find that the five variables are jointly significant as indicated 
by the F test reported in the bottom row of Table 2.  
                                                       
7 Unfortunately, limitations on the availability of data on value-added growth and export orientation did not allow us 
to include most of the bond defaults of the 1990s (such as Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine).   10
Next, we explore a default indicator that takes a value of 1 for every year in which a 
sovereign was rated as “selective default” by Standard and Poor’s. This means that if a sovereign 
went into default and took 20 years to restructure its debts and emerge from insolvency, the 
default indicator variable will take a value of 1 for all of these 20 years. We term this variable 
DEF_ALL_ALL, and report the coefficient on its interaction with export orientation in Columns 
3 and 4. One would expect this variable to be less significant than the variables that measure the 
immediate impact of default because export-oriented firms probably find ways to adjust to the 
situation, and learn how to operate under this environment, even if the trade sanctions or credit 
access problems remain in full force throughout. When we include this variable together with 
DEF_ALL1-DEF_ALL5 (Column 3), we find that it has the right negative sign but a very small 
coefficient (-0.005) and t statistics; however, all default variables are still jointly significant in 
this case. In Column 4, where we drop DEF_ALL1-DEF_ALL5, we find that the coefficient of 
DEF_ALL_ALL increases (in absolute value) to 0.116 (about half the value of the coefficient for 
DEFB2), but remains statistically insignificant (although with a p value of 0.15) These results 
suggest that defaults have a large negative effect on export-oriented firms, but that this effect 
tends to die out for long-lasting default episodes.  
Having established our basic finding that default episodes lead to lower growth in export-
oriented industrial sectors, we now check whether our result is robust to changes in the sample or 
in the econometric specification.  
One possible problem with our data has to do with the fact that in some country-
industries we have very short series of data and while we dropped all countries with less than 10 
industrial sectors, we did not impose any restriction on the number of yearly observations 
available for each given sector in a specific country. As a consequence, our sample includes 792 
observations for country-sectors in which we have less than 10 years of data and 1816 
observations for country-sectors in which we have less than 15 years of data. As a first 
robustness check, we re-estimated our model by dropping all country-sectors for which we have 
less than 15 years of data (we obtain identical results if we drop all country-sectors for which we 
have less than 10 years of data). While this restriction leads to a much smaller sample (the 
sample size drops to 7544), our basic result remains unchanged (Table 3). In particular, the 
coefficient of DEFB2*EXPOU remains negative (with a coefficient which is basically identical 
to that of Column 1 of Table 2) and statistically significant, and the coefficients of   11
DEF_ALL1*EXPOU-DEF_ALL5*EXPOU remain negative (with the exception of 
DEF_ALL3*EXPOU, which is positive but close to zero) and jointly significant. 
Our next robustness test focuses on the definition of the DEF_ALL2-DEF_ALL5 
variables. Since these variables take the lagged value of DEF_ALL1 (which takes a value of 1 in 
the first year of default episode), it would be possible for these variables to take a value of 1 for 
countries that are no longer in default (this would happen if the resolution of the default episode 
takes less than four years). This approach may be justified because the default may still harm 
exporters even after the country has exited from default, since reputation issues may remain in 
financial and international trade markets. It seems nevertheless reasonable to check whether our 
results are robust to setting the DEF_ALL2-DEF_ALL5 variables equal to 0 for all the years 
after the sovereign has exited from default. Table 4 reproduces Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 with 
this modified definition of DEF_ALL2-DEF_ALL5, and shows that this alternative definition 
does not affect the basic results of Table 2. 
After having explored whether our results are robust to different samples and different 
definitions of the default variables, we now check whether small changes in the set of controls 
affect our main result (for the sake of conciseness, we will focus this robustness analysis on the 
basic specification in Column 1).
8 We start by dropping the interaction between export 
orientation and GDP growth (Column 1 of Table 5). Given that growth tends to be low during 
default periods, and given our previous finding that export-oriented sectors are less procyclical 
than sectors that target the domestic market, we expect that estimating the model without 
GDPGR*EXPOU should bias downward the estimate of DEFB2*EXPOU (because this variable 
would capture the effect of GDPGR*EXPOU and the effect of this variable goes in an opposite 
direction relative the effect of default). In fact, the coefficient of DEFB2*EXPOU drops by 
approximately 20 percent (from -0.22 to -0.17), but we also find that that this variable remains 
statistically significant with a t-statistic of 2.22.   
In Column 2 of Table 5, we drop the interaction between export orientation and changes 
in the real exchange rate. Also in this case, omitting the effect of the real exchange rate should 
lead to lower point estimates of the coefficient of DEFB2*EXPOU. In fact, we find that neither 
the point estimate nor the significance of DEFB2*EXPOU changes with respect to the baseline 
regression of Table 2. However, we find that in this specification, GDPGR*EXPOU becomes 
                                                       
8 The results of Columns 2-4 of Table 2 are also robust to these alternative specifications.   12
statistically significant (with the expected negative sign). In Column 3, we drop both 
GDPGR*EXPOU and DRER*EXPOU. We find that the coefficient of DEFB2*EXPOU drops to 
-0.168 but remains statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level. In Column 4, we 
substitute the change in the real exchange rate with the level of the real exchange rate. While the 
coefficient on RER*EXPOU has the expected positive sign but is not statistically significant (the 
p value is 0.15), we find that DEFB2*EXPOU remains negative and highly significant (if 
anything, both the point estimate and the t statistics are higher than in the baseline case). In 
Column 5, we augment the baseline model with the lag of the change of the real exchange rate 
(lagdRER*EXPOU). Again, this does not affect our basic result. Finally, in Column 6, we 
augment our regression with the interaction between export orientation and an external shock 
defined as average (weighted by trade shares) GDP growth of country’s i trading partners to 
account for the evolution of demand for exports. Formally, we define the external shock as 
follows: 
 






SHOCK , 1 , , ∑ − = φ  
 
where GDPGRj,t measures real GDP growth in country j in period t, φij,t is the fraction of export 
from country i going to country j, and EXPi/GDPi measures country i average exports expressed 
as a share of GDP. The rationale for including this variable is that default episodes may happen 
at a time of a global economic slowdown, and hence the poor performance of exporters in 
country i might owe to the fact that its main trading partners are also in a period of low growth, 
rather than the default episode itself.
9 We find that EXTSH*EXPOU has the expected (positive) 
sign but is not statistically significant. While controlling for demand in partner countries reduces 
the coefficient of DEFB2*EXPOU (from 0.218 to 0.177), we still find that this variable remains 
a significant determinant of value-added growth.  
So far we focused on defaults on international bank loans and sovereign bonds (as 
classified by Standard and Poor’s) and did not consider Paris Club defaults, which are the focus 
of Rose’s (2002) analysis. As a final robustness check, we look at what happens when we focus 
on Paris Club defaults (the last column of Table A4 shows that our sample includes 26 Paris 
                                                       
9 We would like to thank Kevin Cowan for suggesting this interpretation.   13
Club defaults).
10  In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, we reproduce our baseline specification 
replacing S&P defaults with Paris Club defaults (as we limit our sample to countries with at least 
one default episode, the regressions now include 15 countries and 5,223 observations). We find 
that the coefficient of DEFB2 is similar to that of our benchmark specification and is close to 
being statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level (the p-value is 0.105). The 
second column of the table shows a large and negative coefficient in the year after default and no 
significant coefficients in the following and previous years. We also find that the coefficients are 
not jointly significant. In Columns 3 and 4, we repeat the experiment by including all types of 
default (both Paris Club and S&P), and our sample now includes 27 countries (with 56 default 
episodes) and 10482 observations. We find that the results are similar to those of our benchmark 
regressions in Table 2. In particular, we find that DEFB2 has a large and statistically significant 
coefficient and that the five lags of the default dummy are jointly significant with the largest 
effect in the year that follows the default episode.  
5. Is There a Difference between Bond Defaults and Bank Defaults? 
In the specifications of the previous section we did not differentiate between defaults on 
international bank loans and defaults on sovereign bonds. Yet, these two types of defaults may 
have different effects. For example, if the main channel through which exporters are affected is a 
retrenchment of trade finance, sovereign defaults on bank loans may have a stronger impact. 
Moreover, bond defaults tend to affect a much larger number of creditors (which often include 
domestic banks), and the harmful effects may affect export and non-export-oriented firms 
equally. In Table 7, we estimate the effect of these two types of default separately. In Column 1, 
our main explanatory variable is BANKDEFB2*EXPOU. This variable is defined as 
DEFB2*EXPOU but only considers episodes of defaults on international bank loans (there are 
31 of these episodes in our sample). The results are very similar to those in our benchmark 
model, suggesting that bank defaults have a negative, large (at -0.197, the point estimate is just 
below that of the baseline regression) and statistically significant impact on the performance of 
export oriented sectors.   
In Column 2 of Table 7, we estimate the effect of bond defaults (BONDDEFB2 is 
defined like BANKDEFB2 but only takes a value of 1 during defaults on sovereign bonds). We 
                                                       
10 In most cases, the Paris Club defaults are the same as the S&P defaults, with slightly different timing.   14
find that, although the effect of bond defaults is stronger than that of bank defaults (the point 
estimate is equal to -0.232), the coefficient is not even close to being statistically significant. The 
fact that our sample contains only a small number of bonded debt default episodes, however, 
does not give us a good basis from which to draw any strong conclusions on this issue.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper uses a difference-in-difference methodology similar to the one originally proposed by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) to test whether defaulting hurts the more export-oriented industries. 
Strong support for this hypothesis was found, but contrary to the findings of previous studies, our 
estimations suggest that the effect of defaults is short-lived. 
It should be clear that this paper cannot say anything on whether defaults affect total 
exports or total growth. For instance, it would be possible (albeit unlikely) that at time of default, 
non-export-oriented industries would pick up growth (or exports) and that this would more than 
compensate for the relative decline of export-oriented industries. While the Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) difference-in-difference methodology indicates how one sector moves relative to another, 
it does not provide any information on the global behavior of a country’s output.
11 Furthermore, 
our data only cover the industrial sector and hence cannot shed any light on what happens to the 
service or agriculture sectors. With this caveat in mind, if one believes that the export sector is 
the economy’s most dynamic sector and a source of important positive externalities (Hausmann 
and Rodrik, 2003), then any negative shock to this sector is likely to have important negative 
repercussions on overall welfare. 
 
                                                       
11 For instance, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) use a methodology similar to the one used in this paper to estimate 
whether bank concentration affects value-added growth in industries that require more external financing (this was 
Rajan and Zingales’ 1998 method of differentiating industries) and find conflicting results. On the one hand, they 
find that concentration promotes the growth of industries that require more external finance. On the other hand, they 
find that bank concentration leads to lower overall GDP growth.      15
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
  Mean  Median  St. dev  25 pctile  75 pctile  Max  Min  N.Obs 
  Variables measured at the country-sector-year level 
VAGR 0.046  0.018  0.29  -0.10  0.21  1.40  -0.55  9735 
SHAREVA 0.039  0.023 0.05  0.009  0.05  0.52  5e-06 9735 
  Variables measured at the country-sector level 
EXPOU 0.07  0.03  0.11  0.01  0.09  0.96  0  639 
  Variables measured at the country-year level 
RER 106.7  100  80.7  79.3  113.5  1435  8.40  386 
DRER 0.11  0.01  1.14  -0.06  0.08  21.31  -0.86  386 
GDPGR  0.03  0.04 0.05 0.005  0.06 0.19  -0.13 386 
DEFB2  0.13  0 0.34  0  0  1  0 386 





Table 2. Benchmark Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Lagged share in value added  -2.892  -2.896  -2.896  -2.898 
  (12.22)*** (12.22)*** (12.22)*** (12.20)*** 
dRER*EXPOU 0.201  0.199  0.199  0.201 
 (2.53)**  (2.46)**  (2.46)**  (2.53)** 
GDPGR*EXPOU  -1.137 -0.992 -0.992 -0.878 
 (1.35)  (1.14)  (1.14)  (1.04) 
DEFB2*EXPOU -0.218       
 (2.54)**       
DEF_ALL1*EXPOU   -0.141  -0.137   
   (1.07)  (0.96)   
DEF_ALL 2*EXPOU    -0.292  -0.289   
   (2.82)***  (2.75)***   
DEF_ALL 3*EXPOU    -0.014  -0.012   
   (0.14)  (0.11)   
DEF_ALL 4*EXPOU    -0.169  -0.167   
   (1.70)*  (1.63)   
DEF_ALL 5*EXPOU    -0.181  -0.179   
   (2.00)**  (1.88)*   
DEF_ALL_ALL*EXPOU     -0.005  -0.116 
     (0.05)  (1.44) 
Constant -0.123  -0.131  0.102  0.104 
 (0.97)  (1.16)  (1.04)  (1.05) 
Observations 9360  9360  9360  9360 
R-squared  0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
F test def*EXPOU jointly 
significant 
 2.72  2.36  
Prob > F    0.019  0.028   
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
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Table 3. Robustness Analysis Using Country-Sectors with at Least 15 Years of Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Real VA growth  Real VA growth  Real VA growth  Real VA growth 
Lagged share in value added  -3.636  -3.637  -3.647  -3.638 
  (10.32)*** (10.31)*** (10.32)*** (10.31)*** 
vardRER  0.015 0.005 0.016 0.001 
  (0.14) (0.05) (0.14) (0.01) 
GDPGR*EXPOU  -1.395 -1.282 -1.181 -1.293 
  (1.55) (1.36) (1.30) (1.37) 
DEFB2*EXPOU -0.208       
 (2.33)**       
DEF_ALL1*EXPOU   -0.109  -0.062 
   (0.81)  (0.43) 
DEF_ALL  2*EXPOU   -0.287  -0.256 
   (2.57)**  (2.27)** 
DEF_ALL  3*EXPOU   0.005  0.034 
   (0.05)  (0.32) 
DEF_ALL  4*EXPOU   -0.133  -0.110 
   (1.35)  (1.07) 
DEF_ALL  5*EXPOU   -0.185  -0.161 
   (2.27)**    (1.79)* 
DEF_ALL_ALL*EXPOU     -0.136  -0.059 
     (1.67)*  (0.59) 
Constant  -0.175 -0.089 -0.081 0.029 
  (1.19) (0.93) (0.80) (0.20) 
Observations 7544  7544  7544  7544 
R-squared  0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 
F test def*EXPOU jointly sign.    2.60    2.17 
Prob > F    0.024    0.043 
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent   
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Table 4. Robustness Analysis, Setting DEF_ALL2-DEF_ALL5=0 if DEF_ALL_ALL=0 
 (1)  (2) 
  Real VA growth  Real VA growth 
Lagged share in value added  -2.900  -2.900 
 (12.21)***  (12.21)*** 
vardRER 0.203  0.203 
 (2.57)**  (2.56)** 
GDPGR*EXPOU -0.933  -0.939 
 (1.07)  (1.07) 
DEF_ALL1*EXPOU -0.117  -0.104 
 (0.88)  (0.73) 
DEF_ALL 2*EXPOU  -0.293  -0.280 
 (2.40)**  (2.12)** 
DEF_ALL 3*EXPOU  0.057  0.070 
 (0.50)  (0.55) 
DEF_ALL 4*EXPOU  -0.151  -0.139 
 (1.14)  (0.96) 
DEF_ALL 5*EXPOU  -0.128  -0.119 
 (1.28)  (1.10) 
DEF_ALL_ALL*EXPOU   -0.020 
   (0.18) 
Constant -0.135  0.097 
 (1.19)  (0.98) 
Observations 9360  9360 
R-squared 0.43  0.43 
F test def*EXPOU jointly significant  2.13  1.81 
Prob > F  0.059  0.092 
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent   
 
 
Table 5.  Robustness Analysis, Different Controls  
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












Lagged share in v.a.  -2.890  -2.897 -2.816  -2.906  -3.004  -2.891 
  (12.18)*** (12.23)*** (12.37)***  (12.35)***  (11.28)***  (12.01)*** 
dRER*EXPOU 0.221       0.203  0.212 
 (3.15)***        (2.62)***  (2.82)*** 
GDPGR*EXPOU   -1.545   -1.467  -0.925  0.222 
   (1.90)*   (1.77)*  (1.05)  (0.27) 
RER*EXPOU       0.001     
       (1.44)     
lagdRER*EXPOU      0.125   
         (1.32)   
EXT_SH*EXPOU         1.404 
           (0.17) 
DEFB2*EXPOU  -0.179 -0.228 -0.168  -0.239  -0.232  -0.177 
 (2.20)**  (2.66)***  (2.08)**  (2.80)***  (2.52)**  (2.19)** 
Constant  -0.120 -0.007 -0.116 -0.303 -0.780 -0.363 
 (0.95)  (0.06)  (1.18)  (2.95)***  (5.01)***  (3.64)*** 
Observations 9360  9360  9651  9360  9020  8908 
R-squared  0.43 0.43 0.42  0.43  0.43  0.44 
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent   19
Table 6. Paris Club Defaults 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 








  ONLY PARIS CLUB DEFAULTS  PARIS CLUB AND S&P 
DEFAULTS 
Lagged share in value added  -2.177  -2.178  -2.698  -2.699 
 (8.62)***  (8.59)***  (12.65)***  (12.65)*** 
dRER*EXPOU -0.091  -0.086  0.167  0.161 
 (0.50)  (0.48)  (1.95)*  (1.83)* 
GDPGR*EXPOU  -2.061 -2.054 -1.475 -1.459 
 (1.74)*  (1.72)*  (1.67)*  (1.62) 
DEFB2*EXPOU  -0.202  -0.230  
 (1.62)    (2.92)***   
DEF_ALL1*EXPOU   -0.006  -0.079 
   (0.03)  (0.72) 
DEF_ALL  2*EXPOU   -0.367  -0.338 
   (2.28)**    (3.55)*** 
DEF_ALL  3*EXPOU   0.117  0.020 
   (0.59)  (0.17) 
DEF_ALL 4*EXPOU    0.123    -0.063 
   (0.84)  (0.70) 
DEF_ALL  5*EXPOU   -0.036  -0.053 
   (0.24)  (0.65) 
Constant 0.021  -0.233  -0.232  0.078 
  (0.08)  (0.88) (1.86)* (0.56) 
Observations 5223  5223  10482  10482 
R-squared  0.36 0.36 0.40 0.40 
F test def*EXPOU jointly 
significant 
 1.68  2.72 
Prob > F    0.137    0.019 
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Table 7.  Bond and Bank Defaults 
Robust t statistics in parentheses       







 (1)  (2) 
  Real VA growth  Real VA growth 
Lagged share in value added  -2.891  -2.902 
 (12.20)***  (12.21)*** 
dRER*EXPOU 0.200  0.205 
 (2.52)**  (2.67)*** 
realgdpgr*EXPOU -1.111  -0.750 
 (1.31)  (0.90) 
BANKDEFB2*EXPOU -0.196   
 (2.24)**   
BONDDEFB2*EXPOU   -0.232 
   (0.73) 
Constant -0.123  -0.143 
 (0.97)  (1.26) 
Observations 9360  9360 
R-squared 0.43  0.43   21
Table A1.  Description of the Variables 
  
VAGR  3 digit ISIC manufacturing value-added growth in constant dollars. Calculated and 
deflated using CPI from the IMF International Financial Statistics 
SHVA  Share of value added in sector j over total manufacturing value added. Calculated (using 











, ,  
EXPOU  Average share of exports over sales for country i, sector j. Data for exports are from Nicita 
and Olarrega (2001) and data for sales (output) are from UNIDO Industrial statistics 2003. 



















EXPOU , We use 
data over the 1982-1999 period because the Nicita and Olarrega (2001) data-set ends in 
1999 and data prior to 1982 are poor quality. As the data tend to be noisy, we drop the top 








RER  Real bilateral (with respect to the US) exchange rate index. 19??=100. A higher value 
indicates a depreciated exchange rate 
DRER  Percentage change in RER 
GDPGR  GDP growth calculated using real local currency data from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
DEFB2  Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in the first and second year of a default episode. 
Source Standard and Poor’s 
DEF_ALL  Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 whenever a country is in default. Source Standard 
and Poor’s 
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ARG 0.024  0.025  28 
BGR 0.095  0.086  27 
BOL 0.064  0.091  27 
CHL 0.043  0.046  28 
CMR 0.049  0.061  26 
CRI 0.097  0.077  28 
ECU 0.029  0.032  28 
ETH 0.025  0.067  22 
HND 0.177  0.198  20 
IDN 0.089  0.084  27 
IRN 0.011  0.036  28 
JOR 0.139  0.175  27 
KEN 0.055  0.066  26 
MAR 0.059  0.080  26 
MEX 0.152  0.139  28 
MWI 0.090  0.214  20 
PAN 0.033  0.042  27 
PER 0.024  0.040  28 
PHL 0.100  0.100  28 
POL 0.063  0.041  28 
TUR 0.042  0.039  28 
URY 0.055  0.045  28 
VEN 0.031  0.052  28 
ZAF 0.233  0.174  28 
ALL COUNTRIES  0.073  0.108  639 
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Table A3. Summary Export Orientation by Industrial Sector 
ISIC3 Product Classification  Mean  Std. Dev.  Freq. 
313 Beverages  0.015  0.022  24 
342 Printing and publishing  0.019  0.027  24 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products  0.025  0.045  24 
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products  0.033  0.035  15 
356 Plastic products  0.034  0.039  24 
341 Paper and products  0.035  0.036  24 
371 Iron and steel  0.039  0.05  22 
381 Fabricated metal products  0.039  0.04  24 
314 Tobacco  0.053  0.194  24 
352 Other chemicals  0.056  0.124  24 
362 Glass and products 0.058  0.064  22 
353 Petroleum refineries  0.061  0.08  20 
355 Rubber products  0.066  0.101  24 
361 Pottery, china, earthenware  0.07  0.135  22 
321 Textiles  0.072  0.049  24 
332 Furniture, except metal  0.081  0.134  24 
383 Machinery, electric  0.081  0.106  23 
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic  0.083  0.13  24 
311 Food Products  0.087  0.088  24 
331 Wood products, except furniture  0.088  0.086  24 
351 Industrial chemicals  0.09  0.076  23 
382 Machinery, except electrical  0.099  0.117  23 
384 Transport equipment  0.108  0.193  23 
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear  0.109  0.091  24 
390 Other manufactured products  0.136  0.127  22 
385 Professional and scientific equipment 0.137  0.165  20 
323 Leather products  0.14  0.133  24 
372 Non-ferrous metals  0.145  0.101  20 
ALL SECTORS  0.073  0.108  639 
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Table A4. Default Episodes Included in the Sample 
    Standard and Poor’s  Paris Club 
Country Year  Bank  Defaults  Bonds Default  All    
ARG 1982  1  0 1 0 
ARG 1985  0  0 0 1 
BGR 1990  1  0 1 0 
BGR 1991  0  0 0 1 
BOL 1986  1  0 1 1 
BOL 1989  0  1 1 0 
CHL 1983  1  0 1 0 
CHL 1985  0  0 0 1 
CMR 1985  1  0 1 0 
CMR 1989  0  0 0 1 
CRI 1981  1  0 1 0 
CRI 1983  1  1 1 1 
CRI 1989  0  0 0 1 
ECU 1982  1  0 1 0 
ECU 1983  0  0 0 1 
ECU 1988  0  0 0 1 
ECU 1999  0  1 1 0 
EGY 1987  0  0 0 1 
EGY 1991  0  0 0 1 
ETH 1991  1  0 1 0 
HND 1981  1  0 1 0 
IDN 1998  1  0 1 0 
IRN 1978  1  0 1 0 
JOR 1989  1  0 1 1 
JOR 1992  0  0 0 1 
KEN 1994  1  0 1 0 
MAR 1983  1  0 1 0 
MAR 1986  1  0 1 0 
MEX 1982  1  0 1 0 
MEX 1983  0  0 0 1 
MEX 1986  0  0 0 1 
MEX 1989  0  0 0 1 
MWI 1982  1  0 1 1 
PAK 1981  0  0 0 1 
PAN 1983  1  0 1 0 
PAN 1985  0  0 0 1 
PAN 1987  0  1 1 0 
PAN 1990  0  0 0 1 
PER 1984  1  0 1 0 
PHL 1983  1  0 1 0 
PHL 1984  0  0 0 1 
PHL 1987  0  0 0 1 
POL 1981  1  0 1 1 
POL 1985  0  0 0 1 
POL 1990  0  0 0 1 
TTO 1984  0  0 0 1 
TUR 1982  1  0 1 0 
URY 1983  1  0 1 0 
URY 1987  1  0 1 0 
URY 1990  1  0 1 0 
VEN 1983  1  0 1 0 
VEN 1990  1  0 1 0 
VEN 1995  0  1 1 0 
ZAF 1985  1  0 1 0 
ZAF 1989  1  0 1 0 
ZAF 1993  1  0 1 0 
TOTAL   31  5 35 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 